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This essay represents an attempt to critically assess the intel-
lectual orientation often termed 'structuralism.' In particular,
the essay is concerned with European, and even.more specifical-
ly French, structuralism as displayed in the writings of Louis
Althusser, Roland Barthes, Michel Foucault, and C. Levi-
Strauss. The analysis indicates that despite a novel language,
an often rigorous character, and some interesting, indeed
exciting, intellectual constructions, structuralism is very much
a child of positivism. The positivism[structuralism relationship
is most clearly revealed when structuralism is contrasted with
Marxian social inquiry. For comparative and illustrative pur-
poses, then, the essay contrasts structuralism and Marxism.
For all its possibilities, structuralism was stillborn and to know
it now is to seize its character as an instantaneous transforma-
tion. Nietzsche would, of course, have said that it appeared in
the 'hour of its shortest shadow' (Bouchard; in Foucault,
1977:16).
Structuralism "was" an intellectual tour de force whose
understandability was never particularly great. Shrouded in the
argot of linguistics, it managed to present itself as an intellec-
tual posture to be reckoned with; yet always on the far 'side of
comprehension. This was its public image. It was an enigma for
all those honest social theorists who sought to construct a
modern social science predicated upon humans in the real world.
By its very enigmatic status, however, structuralism was deemed
important. The claim by Bouchard that structuralism has ex-
pired is historically inaccurate and naive, for structuralism is
far from dead. It lives in the form of a hundred pedantic syn-
theses with the orientations it once seemingly opposed.
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A single presentation cannot adequately detail the numerous
epistemological and metatheoretical differences that exist be-
tween structuralism and all other sociological traditions. We
have selected Marxist social thought as the contrasting per-
spective, since a number of the leading structuralists (e.g., Al-
thusser, Barthes, and Levi-Strauss) have posited certain theo-
retical affinities between their work and Marxism. Althusser and
the others notwithstanding, it is our contention that a compari-
son of Marxism and structuralism brings into sharp relief some
of the more important dimensions of the structuralist problema-
tic. Moreover, these aspects of the structuralist problematic
preclude an intellectually honest synthesis of structuralism and
Marxism. .
STRUCTURALISM l
What is structuralism? A veritable plethora of texts have at-
tempted to answer this question. Most have endeavored to
posit the basic theoretical and methodological principles com-
mon to the structuralist project. These efforts have tended to
highlight rather meaningless differences and gloss over critical
ones between structuralism and other orientations. Almost with-
out exception, they have presented structuralism in reference
to unspecified, and certain theoretically incoherent, global
frames; for example, structuralism and sociology, as though
sociology implied some understandable whole. As Miriam Glucks-
mann (1971) has suggested, any effort aimed at distilling a core
of the structuralist project is misleading.
Broekman (1974) has suggested three geographic centers
of structuralist research and thought; namely, Moscow, Paris,
and Prague. While these centers of structuralist research are
internally quite differentiated, Broekman argues that each has
a rather distinctive style. To Broekman's list of three, we are
tempted to add a fourth that might be labeled the Anglo-Ameri-
can, typified in the work of Katz (1976) and Mullins (1973).
These centers are not based upon specific methodological, the-
oretical, or metatheoretical claims. They are not even based
upon certain methodological strategies or techniques. Instead,
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they are distinguished by certain theoretical assumptions. It is
only through an examination of these assumptions that one can
comprehend the structuralist project.
Limiting our discussion here to Parisian structuralism
Roland Barthes (1972:213-220), approaches the structuralist
project by centering on the category of "activity." Since prac-
tice, action, activity [praxis] are central concepts in Marxian
thought, Barthes' notion of "structuralist activity" provides
an avenue through which one can contrast the two positions.
Here we shall let Barthes (1972:214-215) speak for himself:
structuralism is essentially an activity, i.e., the controlled
succession of a certain number of mental operations....
The goal of all structuralist activity, whether reflexive or poetic,
is to reconstruct on 'object' in such a way as to manifest there-
by the rules of functioning (the 'functions') of this object....
Structural man takes the real, decomposes it, then recomposes
it ... between the two objects, or the two tenses, of struc-
turalist activity, there occurs something new, and what is new
is nothing less than the generally Intelligible: the simulacrum is
intellect added to object, and this addition has an anthro-
pological value, in that it is man himself, his history, his situa-
tion, his freedom, and the very resistance which nature offers
to his mind.
We see, then, why we must speak -of-a- structuralist activity:
creation or reflection are not, here, an original 'impression'
of the world, but a veritable fabrication of a world which
resembles the primary one, not in order to copy it but to render
it intelligible.
Barthes appeals to a number of central categories around
which he structures his discourse; the notions of activity, an-
thropological value, decomposition, object, recomposition,
simulacrum, structural man, and intelligibility are all used as
important ordering concepts. Perhaps for our purposes the most
significant segment of this passage refers to Barthes contention
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that the structuralist activity can be viewed as "the controlled
succession of a certain number of mental operations" (empha-
sis added). The most obvious and immediate implication of this
claim is that, with a structuralist project, activity is concep-
tualized as an attribute of being which is engaged exclusively
at the level of pure intellect.
In Marxist thought, there is always a dialectical nexus
between the being which is active and the activity of that being.
As with pragmatist thought, the Marxist notion of practice is
inseparably fused with the notion of truth. Both activity and
truth are, from the Marxist vantage, viewed as products of
the totality of human life and not mere by-products of the
human intellect. In addition, Marxist thought considers the
human capability for action as an essential quality of truth
itself. The crucial difference here is that the Marxist position,
contrary to that outlined by Barthes, posits truth and action as
something more profound and involved than a mere residual
consequence or category of human cognition. Truth derived
from scientific inquiry is, moreover, not considered to be ren-
dered valid simply on the basis of its "utility" [i.e., use-value)
in deciphering or decoding a reality, be it social or "natural,"
which is independent of human experience. On the contrary,
Marxist social thought contains no justification for the notion
of an independent reality or a reality which has relevance only to
pure intellect. Regarding this point, Marx's (1970:47) rather
over-quoted line, "life is not determined by consciousness, but
consciousness by life," seems to be particularly germane.
. .... Within the Marxist theoretical frame, activity is used as
synonymous with action in two rather special ways. First, it is
used as an opposition to non-action. Activity in this instance
refers to processes such as labor, and as a differentiation of the
human activity of intelligence from other activity. Second,
activity is used as an indicator of the state which envelops
intelligence by preceding it, preparing the conditions of its
existence, and following and surpassing it. Furthermore, it
refers to that dimension of thought itself which is characterized
by the process of internal synthesis more than by the process
of objective representation (Blondel, 1902).
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. In Barthes' formulation activity remains essentially an
affaIr of the intellect and occurs primarily, if not exclusively,
as mental activity. The notion of an actual event between a
subject and an historical object is nowhere to be found in
Barthes' statement. Here again, there is a marked contrast be-
tween activity on the one hand and praxis on the other. From
the standpoint of etymology the Hegelian/Marxist notion of
praxis is also associated with activity and/or action. However,
among certain Hegelians in general and the writings of Marx
in particular, praxis refers to the historical character of techni-
cal, economic, social, and cultural collective human action.
Moreover, this action is viewed as the basis for and the judg-
ment of theoretical thought and ideology. The complexity of
this notion is far greater than that associated with Barthes'
notion of activity. Instead of remaining wholly within the
subject the notion of praxis necessarily interlinks subject and
object (or another subject). Thus, the result of praxis is not
a simulacrum but rather a dialectical change in both subject and
object vis a vis their relationship in social reality.
MAN'S PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY
Another notion of considerable interest in Barthes' state-
ment, is that of "structural man." In the history of Western
thought one can encounter many "typifications" of man. For
example, man has been termed Homo faber, Homo oecon-
ornicus, Homo sapiens, anima naturaliter scientifica, 2 and Homo
ludens .to mention but a few. Thus, man has been cast as the
maker,3 as an actor determining his actions by economic in-
terests to the virtual exclusion of any motives of passion,
morality, religiosity, etc.: as the first species in' the animal
kingdom as illustrated in Carolus Linnaeus'" classification system
and as a player of games. These notions share the peculiar attri-
bute of existing as unidimensional universals. Each seems to be
proclaiming the identification of an' essential attribute (the
essence) that simultaneously identifies and elaborates upon some
quintessential quality of mans' being. One might suggest, there-
fore, that Barthes' structural man, having lost his Latin ecriture,
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and assumed a more acceptable literary slant, expresses his
nature through the examination of discourse. Man is reduced
to a segment of his own intellectual processes and activity as
though he were but an occasionally engaged cog in a machine
not of his own design. Structural man is identical to Homo
loquax. That is to say, the man who thinks when he thinks
(or thinks about his thinking) is but a reflection of his own
words (see Bergson, 1959). In any event, these conceptualiza-
tions of man are at best partial and fragmented in contrast to
that offered by Marx. For example, Marx (II, 1967:19) states
that "man is by his nature ... a social animal." Here, in contrast
to all of the other conceptualizations of man, man is defined
in terms that account for both his being and activity rather
than a single dimension such as his activity or his subjectivity.
The abstract and anti-empirical nature of Barthes' structural
man and his structuralist activity are strongly paralleled in
Levi-Strauss' structural anthropology. For Levi-Strauss, the
notion of structure has virtually nothing to do with empirical
reality. Social structure is a constructed conceptual schema
designed to operate as a category of mediation between reality
(itself unknowable) and the universal unconscious structure of
the human mind. Thus, both Barthes' activity and Levi-Strauss'
social structure are best understood as methodologies or "tech-
niques" of inquiry and not, as is true with Marxism, the objects
of inquiry. Furthermore, as methodologies they are devoid of
historical content or relations with a subject. In the final anal-
ysis, to speak of a historical' dimension or subject relation in
.reference to methodological.properties isa.non sequitur.
The importance of history in specific understanding· is the
dimension of inquiry that modern structuralists have not appre-
ciably comprehended.5 Method cannot totally transcend the
historical conditions encompassing its practitioners. In this
light, the technical rigor and near clinical detachment of struc-
turalist scholars projects an image of positivistic integrity which
mystifies the very history that made structuralism itself a pos-
sibility. The prevalent structuralist avoidance of historical con-
cerns, including a reflexive analysis of structuralism itself, dimi-
nishes its interpretive utility. It would be untrue, however, to
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suggest that all structuralists are insensitive to the problem of
"history. ,,6
Jacques Derrida (1967 :46), a "post" structuralist attempted
to address the historical issue:
We must therefore try to free ourselves from this language
restriction imposed by the very language and concepts. Not
actually attempt to free ourselves from it, for that is imposs-
ible without denying our own historical situation.... But
rather, imagine doing so. Not actually free ourselves from it,
for that would make no sense and would deprive us of the
light (its) meaning can provide. But rather, resist it as far as
possible.
The most cursory examination of the works of Althusser,
Barthes, Foucault, and Levi-Strauss reveals numerous references
into history. The structuralists are clearly not unconcerned with
history per see But what separates their concern with history
from the concerns of the Marxists is the type of history they
deem important, and the value and role of the subject in that
history. Structuralism operates with a "model" of a compart-
mentalized history of logical categories devoid of subjects which
are subject only to methodological governance. In short, struc-
turalism operates with a non-historical history in order to justify
its preoccupation with formal analysis and the pure intellect.
As Marx (1970:35) stated in the German Ideology, concerns of
this nature must necessarily be non-historical since intellect
(i.e., c.onsciousness) .has no history of its own. History, here,
becomes an irrelevant category.
STRUCTURALISM VS. MARXISM
Structuralism as Method?
Michael Lane (1970:32-32) makes the claim that struc-
turalism is not a theory or metatheoretical orientation but a
method of inquiry "whose primary intention is to permit the
investigator to go beyond a pure description of what he per-
ceives or experiences, in the direction of the quality of rationality
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which underlies the social phenomenon in which he is con-
cerned." It should be obvious from Lane's comment that struc-
turalism as method can only be taken as legitimate description
if one is willing to operate with an extremely broad notion of
methodology. This point is further clarified by Levi-Strauss
(1975) in the Overture of The Raw and the Cooked when he
states:
We are engaged in researching for the conditions under which
systems of truth become mutually convertible.... Following
the example of structural linguistics, structural anthropology
shifts its consideration away from the conscious relations ... to
unconscious ones, hoping to find there a system from which
general laws may be derived.... The structuralist method ... is
a means whereby social reality may be expressed as binary
oppositions, each element, whether ... an event in a myth, an
item of behaviour, or the naming and classification of natural
phenomena, being given its value in society by its relative
position in a matrix of oppositions, their mediations and re-
solutions.
These two conceptualizations of structuralism as method
are worthy of more detailed consideration. First, there is the
contention that structuralism is only a method and not a the-
oretical orientation. Second, there is the concern with, in Levi-
Strauss' phrase, the "conditions under which systems of truth
, become mutually convertible" (emphasis 'added)'. In contradic-
tion .to the first contention, this second concern is not purely ,
methodological. Third, the lack of concern with conscious
reality, and preoccupation with "unconscious. reality" or, per-
haps more appropriately, preconscious reality. Fourth, the belief
that these unconscious dimensions are expressed through op-
position (e.g., binary oppositions for Barthes and Levi-Strauss).
Finally, that these oppositions provide the basis by which the
entire project proceeds towarda goal of generating further logical
constructs which, in principle, are to be extended across the
entire range of social and natural phenomena.
112
A Critique of Selected Features
The structuralism as method position can be addressed
indirectly via Marx's critique of Proudhon's philosophy. Marx
(1963), commenting on Proudhon's (1946) Philosophic de la
Misere states:
In the same way that through abstraction we transform every-
thing into a logical category, we also make abstraction of every
distinctive character of the different movements, to arrive at
movement in the abstract state, at purely formal movement,
at the purely logical form.... If we find in the logical cate-
gories the substance of everything, we imagine ourselves to find
in ... logical form ... the absolute method ... everything being
reduced to a logical category ... , it naturally follows that
every ensemble of products and production, objects and their
movement, is reduced to an applied metaphysics.
In a similar vein it could be argued that structuralism is not a
method but a rigorous metaphysics replete with formal techni-
ques and normalized conventions of logical manipulations. The
one question that the structuralist must confront ,is how can a
"method," when taken in the traditional sense of the term, legiti-
mately encompasss a theory of truth, even if it is an implicit
theory? Moreover, how can a theory of truth not be meta-
physical and yet assert its validity on the basis of logically de-
rived categories independent of any agreed upon reality?
Structure and Categories
Structuralism .has incorporated into its, methodological
frame an entire group of categories borrowed from structural
linguistics, semiotics, and other' interpretive human science
strategies. Some of the more visible of these include Barthes'
notions of system and syntagma; Althusser's (1970) concepts 'of,
problematic, and overdetermination; Levi-Strauss' idea of binary
opposition; and Foucault's categories of episteme and signatures.
The use of these interrelated notions, to the extent that they
operate as a calculus for structuralist analysis, cast the struc-
turalist research object into an entirely new.cognitive and ex-
planatory system. This casting of phenomenon into logical
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categories transfers scientific concerns to a level of analysis
whereby inquiry, on an a priori basis, is always taken as non-
problematic. Thus, the analyst no longer needs to inquire into
the historical origins of the research object or the techniques
utilized to attain an understanding of the object. The concern
with origins ceases to be an issue since it is taken for granted as
being irrelevant.
By returning to Marx's critique of Proudhon, we again dis-
cover certain similarities between structuralist inquiry and the
project proposed by Proudhon. Marx (1963) comments:
At the moment that we do not pursue ... the historical move-
ment of the relations of production, of which the categories are
but a theoretical expression, at that moment we want to see
these categories just as ideas ... independent of the real rela-
tions, we are forced to assign as the origin of these thoughts
the movement of pure reason. How does pure reason, eternal,
impersonal, make itself and the source of these thoughts? How
does it proceed to produce them?
For structuralism, the entire analytical process, the forma-
tion and organization of structures, occurs on a level that has
little relationship with man, nature, or human work and action.
The structuralist categories, technique, and view are all rooted
in abstraction. Yet, this abstraction is posited as real, true to
reality, and capable of penetration via analysis. But what the
structuralists fail to realize is that abstraction cannot negate
itself; it can only reproduce itself in further abstraction. Thus,
the structuralists do not question the relevance, origins, and
nature of their categories. The categories become, in every man-
ner of speaking, the structuralists' data; not data of the social
world nor· from the social world. Yet this data is supposed to be
able to explain that world. It is at this point that structuralism
and Marxism are worlds apart; regardless of whether one terms
structuralism theory, method, technique, and/or world-view.
Subject-Subject Relations
Earlier it was noted that structuralism has manifested a
central concern with "deep structures" or unconscious structures
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of social reality. Employing Marx's three levels of the social
totality (i.e., super-structure, infra-structure, and praxis) as a
point of contrast to the notion of deep structure, one can see a
marked contrast between the two positions. This contrast is,
perhaps, most noticeable regarding the issue of subject-object
relationships and/or subject-subject relationships. With structural-
ism an almost insurmountable idealism prevails regarding such
relationships. By centering all analytical concerns upon uncon-
scious, as opposed to conscious levels of analysis, structuralism
delimits man to ·a passive non-productive being. Thus, structural-
ism views all data as restricted to the level of superstructure.
Moreover, the superstructure is posited as determining all other
levels, to the extent that structuralism acknowledges other levels.
In addition, regarding the superstructure itself, the structuralists
differentiate between "deep structure" and "surface structure."
The latter refers to ideology, myth, various types of knowledges
and cognition itself. The real focus of analysis is not upon the
totality (i.e., social relations, modes of production, units of
praxis, etc.) but, rather, upon formal relations which are not
only logically derived but derived at the level of deep structure.
In this way, the structuralists effect a transmutation in subject-
subject relationships, and their real possibilities and capabilities
for conscious action, by reducing all this to phenomenal mani-
festations of the logical constructs and operations of the struc-
turalist "methodology" itself.
Structural Dynamics and Dialectics
Although a number of structuralists have claimed that their
primary goal is to _identify the character of structures so that
they can derive the possible transformations open to a particu-
lar structure, only three structuralists have elaborated notions of
structural transformation. The first is French anthropologist
Levi-Strauss whose research on the structure of kinship led him
and his associates to undertake a formal analysis of the dynamics
involved in the transformation of kinship systems.f The other
two are Louis Althusser and Etienne Balibar. Balibar's approach,
like Althusser's, ostensibly utilizes Marxist categories to address
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the issue of structural transformations. He is particularly interest-
ed in the notions of production and reproduction of wholes.
However, in his essay "Toward a Theory of Transition" (in
Althusser and Balibar, 1970), the manner in which Balibar under-
takes his analysis depicts a concern with the internal dynamics of
structure rather than structural metamorphosis into other dis- .
tinct structures and formations.
Althusser argues for the periodicity of knowledge and for the
identification of structural imbalances (e.g., his appeal to Mao Tse
Tung's theory of contradiction and Bachelard's notion of epis-
temological break). He uses these as concepts to tap into the
internal dynamics of discourse rather than as a means to view
the relationships between global structures. Thus, both Althusser
and Balibar are less concerned with total transformations and
more concerned with internal structural shifts. In neither case is
there much similarity with Marx's theory of global transforma-
tions.
What is of particular interest in the cases of Althusser,
Balibar, and Levi-Strauss is the way in which the dialiectic has
been reformulated. Rather than operating with a Marxian, or even
Hegelian, notion of contradiction (contradiction being a central
notion in the analysis of transformations in wholes) the structural-
ist version of contradiction and transformation comes much closer
to that offered by Nietzsche. 9
Michel Haar (1977) noted that in Nietzsche's system, the
antagonism between two elements was not conceptualized as a
-conflict that brought the elements into a mutual < relation and,
therefore,. attached the elements together, This is, of course,
the dialectical notion of contradiction. Nietzsche viewed the
antagonism between elements as a mutual separation that detach-
ed and distinguished the elements from one another. The Hegelian
opposition of master and slave, for example, is a dialectical rela-
tionship based upon a reciprocity of relations. For Nietzsche,
as well as for the structuralists, opposition is based upon rupture,
a cleavage within the object of their analysis. Moreover, neither
Nietzsche nor the structuralists desire to bridge this cleavage.
For Nietzsche these "paths of distance" are to be underscored and
not negated.
116
-I- .
I
A Critique of Selected Features
Through an examination of Marx's dialectical method, one
can see how the structuralists' approach diverges from the
Marxian. Marx's dialectical method starts from the simplest
fundamental historical relationship, that is, economic relations.
As Engels noted in opposition to popular misinterpretations,
the approach starts, not ends, at this level. In fact, true Marxian
dialectics is quite different from its popularly understood (ortho-
dox Marxist) version. The actual concern of dialectics is with the
determination of the practical relations inherent in all human
existence and in every form of organized human experience.
Simple economic relations do not exhaust the full range of pos-
sible relations. The dialectical method, therefore, is not simply an
exercise in "economic thinking." Rather, it analyzes relations and
then reintegrates them into the totality from which they came.
The fact that there are relations implies the existence of at
least two (frequently opposed) elements. Each of these elements
can be considered in itself. And, from a careful consideration of
each element, one can begin to grasp the character of their mutual
relation; of their action and reaction to each other. This mutual
relation produces antagonisms which will ultimately require a
solution. The transformation begins, according to Engels, when a
solution is required and brought forth. The dialectical movement
is placed in an historical situation involving real men in actual
empirical situations (i.e., relations). The dialectical moments,
oppositions, and negations are derived from these real units, in
opposition to the "structural processes" characteristic of struc-
turalist thought. In the latter case, the identification of "struc-
tures" is accomplished through oppositions of terms, groups of
terms, and sequences of terms; making transformation an internal
affair predicated upon projected logical arrangements. The
contrast between structuralist and dialectical conceptions of
change is evident in Marx's reflection upon his method:
My dialectic method is not only different from the Hegelian, but
is its direct opposite. To Hegel ... the process of thinking, which,
under the name of 'Idea,' he transforms into an Independent sub-
ject, is the demiurgos of the real world, and the real world is only
the external, phenomenal form of the 'Idea.' With me ... the
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ideal is nothing else than .the material world reflected by the
human mind, and translated into forms of thought (1967:19).
In the above passage, it is still possible to visualize a subject
in the social process. That is, the subject is active in the 'Idea' or,
if one prefers, the collective and historical growth of man. In
structuralism, however, even Hegel's synthetic subject disappears.
Human reality becomes the product of operations of an uncon-
scious structure which seems to emerge independently of actions
undertaken by any subject(s). Here again, Marx's own words reveal
a fundamental difference:
In its rational form (the dialectic) ... includes in its compre-
hension and affirmative recognition of the existing state of
things, at the same time also, the recognition of the negation of
that state, of its inevitable breaking up; because it regards every
historically developed social form as in fluid movement, and
therefore takes into account its transient nature no less than its
momentary existence ... is in its essence critical and revolu-
tionary (1967:20)
It is exactly the critical and revolutionary dimension that
is missing in the structuralist position on transformation. In this
regard, the issue can be raised, as Lefebvre (1971) did, that the
structuralist preoccupation with the static form of structures
undermines the approach and opens it up to the charge of politi-
cal conservatism.! 0
The Structuralist World-Action and Event
In this final section we will examine selected comments by
Levi-Strauss on social life; thereby providing a glimpse of one
structuralist's view of the world. Accomplishing that, we can
contrast that view with the position taken by Marx.
Levi-Strauss (1963) begins his analysis with the assumption
that all social life is characterized by a quality of systematic
organization. He believes, furthermore, that the possible varieties
of this systematic organization are limited. He states:
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I am persuaded that these systems do not exist in limitless
numbers, and that human societies ... are limited to a choice of
certain combinations from an ideal repertory, which it should
be possible to reconstruct ... because social structures are the
product of a reason (esprit) that is innate in all men. That is,
it is genetically rather than socially or culturally determined.
Further, this reason operates unconsciously, and we have access
to it only through the systems that it forms, myths, kinship
systems, .systems of exchange, linguistic struc-
tures, cultural artifacts, and so on.
In the above, Levi-Strauss posits an ideal level of analysis
which includes all the possible combinatoires. Second, he con-
tends that with any particular period of a given society, the
actual existence of one of these possible structures is operative
at the unconscious level. Third, the conscious "life world" is
always supported by these collective unconscious forces,
(products of the human esprit) which could conceivably be
linked with the structural determinants emanating from the
structure of previous periods (including, at least hypothetically,
negative structures). Fourth, all life processes taking place at
any given moment are grounded in the prevailing structure
which, through mediations, remains primarily unconscious. Fifth,
because of these mediations and the unconscious character of
structures, the explanations for given actions and events offered
by the actors are most often 'illusionary' or ideological. Finally,
the possibility -·for critical evaluation of ongoing actions "aJld
events by the participants is radically constrained.
For Marx, social relations are phenomena that exist in the
real world, and it is from their combinations, transformations,
and evolutions, that global forces are derived. For structuralism,
in marked contrast, structure, the product of collective uncon-
scious reason, is considered the reality and all acts and events are
merely derivations and outgrowths of that reality. 1 1
The Marxian man is an active man, praxis oriented, who
aims at changing and transcending existing contradictions. The
structuralist world appears to be in diametric opposition to that
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proposed by Marx. For structuralism, the world appears epi-
phenomenal and men are viewed as "pawns" engaged in actions
and experiences that unconsciously encompass them. Further-
more, the structuralist view concedes to man only an ability to
engage in fictional explanations of his world. The structuralist
world is a world without a real history of real human beings
since there is no change, only combinations and recombinations
of limited possible structures. Thus, man's only possible practice
becomes a fictional one; man as the stuff of novels.
In overview, the structuralist conception of the world is
defined by a logical or semantical reduction. Human beings in
this world exist essentially in the intellect or the analytical
process. Man, before and above everything else, is viewed as a
creator of forms and significations. Content, to the extent that
structuralists acknowledge it at all, is seen as an irrational residue
which manifests itself only in the fissures and lacunae between
the forms, systems, and structures. For Derrida (1967), this is
captured in his plea to find man and his discourse in the "space
between" things. Furthermore, the intellect is conceptualized
as having a classificatory and combinatory function. It breaks
apart the ensembles into elements and reconstitutes them into
logical systems. The capacity to combine arrangements and
permutations simultaneously determines both intellect and the
intelligible; the instrument and the object.
CONCLUSIONS
...: _..Structuralism removes from its analytical concern much of
the content that Marxism maintains is essential to, and insepa-
rable from, the social world. Structuralism does not concern
itself with the complexities of concrete human praxis. Instead,
analytical rigor and technical/logical manipulations are given
central importance in the structuralist project. Removed also are
the concerns with the social world, history, social-dialectics,
human tragedy, emotion, passion, and the subject. For struc-
turalism, such concerns are discarded and disappear. In their
place structuralism celebrates formal technique. As Poster
(1975:306-360) observes, it is the role of the subject in the
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process of inquiry that places the greatest theoretical gulf
between Marxism and structuralism. Marxism is the science of
man whereas structuralism is the science of man "decentered.'
It is not the anti-historical posture of structuralism which
separates it from Marxism. Rather, it is the kind of history that
each focuses upon. This is not a difference between a diachronic
and synchronic view of reality but between a view of history that
permits subjects to be involved in the production, generation,
and reproduction of social life and a view that does not. The
latter view, the structuralist view, becomes formal in character
out of necessity. And, with that formality, there is a strong
tendency to minimize the difference between that which is a
category of method and that which is the object of analysis.
For example, the structuralist analogy between language and
social reality is at once a methodological technique and a theo-
retical assertion that succumbs to invidious forms of reification,
Thus, what begins as analogy eventuates in a truth claim regard-
ing the actual substance and form of social reality. This is, then,
the ever present risk assumed by the structuralist project whose
nature is essentially anti-reflective, anti-idealist, and anti-
phenomenological.' 2 .
Jan Broekman (1974:98) provides us with yet another
important difference between Marxism and structuralism. Broek-
man observes that Marxism, like a number of other approaches,
never really moves very far from reality itself. For Marxism,
the categories of analysis are either derived from, or funda-
mentally associated- with; human action and the actual empirical
contents of the world. For structuralism, on the other hand,
the process of inquiry never moves very close to either action or
the real world. The Marxist project, furthermore, never really
abrogates its theoretical concern for the essence of things and the
subject as, at least potentially, constituted independently and in
accordance with its own essence and consciousness. Again,
structuralism inevitably leads to the decentrement of the sub-
ject and to a positing of the subject as dependent.
Beginning with Saint-Simon's thesis that society consti-
tuted an organic totality, Auguste Comte led a movement aimed
at fragmenting the social whole by distinguishing between social
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states and social dynamics. Comte, by subordinating the dyna-
mic, gave theoretical and methodological priority to the static.
From Cornte's position, there arose amongst sociologists a
profound concern with static laws, stable relations, and the rules
that maintained their operation of functioning. From this,
positivism was projected into the world as "scientific sociology."
The goal of this new science was clear: to identify the invari-
ances, stabilities, and conditions of equilibrium thought to be
society. Society and man were to be viewed as having to conform
to these regularities since regularities were necessary and, there-
fore, of the natural realm. History, if taken to be anything more
than temporal duration or the succession of temporal moments,
was deemed an illusion, a stream of errors and oscillations finite
and absolute. The only history that mattered was that of things
and their order: not men.
Structuralism, despite its novel language and systematic
and rigorous manipulations, can be considered an extension of
the tradition initiated by Cornte.! 3 Structuralism is not a sound
theoretical bridge between critical and empirical sociologies.
Moreover, despite claims to the contrary, structuralism has
few theoretical affinities with the so-called interpretive tradition.
At its most fundamental level, structuralism is an extension
(albeit a creative one) of the logic inherent in the positivist
tradition. This is a point that cannot be overemphasized. Struc-
turalism, regardless of the sophistication it displays or the num-
erous forms in which it presents itself, remains a source of
theoretical' closure and not an enabling paradigm capable of
advancing sociologic-al thought.
FOOTNOTES
1. Althusser, Barthes, Foucault, and Levi-Strauss are the principal figures
in the present construction of the structuralist problematic. In addition
to being French, each of these scholars has made a central contribution
to structuralist theory and research. For example, Althusser has en-
deavored to articulate "Marxist" concerns through structuralist dis-
course. Barthes has applied a structuralist paradigm and perspective
to a full range of cultural and social phenomenon. Foucault has en-
deavored to develop structuralist discourse and historical techniques.
Finally, Levi-Strauss, perhaps the father of structuralism in the social
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sciences, has done more than anyone else to advance the structuralist
perspective from a theoretical and methodological standpoint.
2. The notion of scientific or empirical man and its opposition concept,
man of faith, are both developed in Peter Berger's volume The Hereti-
cal Imperative. New York: Anchor Books, 1979.
3. Henri Bergson's La Pensee et le rnouvant, in particular p. 105, further
develops this notion of man the maker. For example, he states, HoWe
believe that it is the essence of man to be a rna terial and moral maker
to make things and to make himself. '
4. See C. Linnaeus, A General System ofNature, 1802-1806.
5. To address the historical intent and character of the structuralist
project it is instructive to reflect upon a few points raised by Hans-
Georg Gadamer. Gadamer (1975) undertook a systematic and cal-
culated critique of the 19th century preoccupation with objective
truth and the notion of an absolute or universally correct method of
interpretation. Gadamer claimed that, contrary to the positions advo-
cated by scholars such as Boeckh (see e.g., Encyclopadie und Meth-
odologie der Philologischen Wissenschaften, Leipzig, 1886), there
could be no one methodologie of textual interpretation since inter-
pretation is not a Wissenschaft whose aim is objective and permanent
knowledge. For Gadamer, Truth cannot reside, as the structuralists
seem to believe, in a singular "scientific" act of recognizing an author's
or text's meaning. In the fmal analysis, Gadamer maintained that such
a position was a non-realizable ideal which naively disregarded the
fact that every act of interpretation of a text is, in essence, a new and
different cognition, since, each new cognition involves the interpreter's
own historicity as the specific differentiating criteria. In short, i~ is
the interpreter's history which is the specifica differentia. .
• 6. Jonathan Culler (1975) in his volume Structural Poetics, has an en-
tire segment devoted to just such concerns. In addition, Julia Kristeva
(1969:284) has attempted to discard the structuralist's disjointed no-
rion of history by rejecting the notion of a "gena-text" which is in-
tended to be inclusive of the whole historical evolution of language as
well as the various signifying practices that have emerged. Rather than
viewing a discourse from the ideological position of a single meaning
center with finite variations, Kristeva seeks to posit a technique that
accounts for an infinite number of possible variations and structures
with all the possible historical dimensions; namely, past, present, and
future. The possibility of all languages (i.e., past, present, future) are
123
125
Lefebvre's critique of structuralism is by no means one of the more
recent. And while it remains one of the best, many of its points have
been countered with varying degrees of success. Yet, while scholars
such as M. Poster, P. Ricoeur, and E. Said, to mention but a few, have
advanced new and very sophisticated critiques, Lefebvre's is the most
relevant in the context of a structuralism/Marxism comparison. Addi-
tionally it should be noted that most of Lefebvre's remarks remain
valid at least in terms of structuralist research. For historically there
has been a world of theoretical difference between the metatheoretical
defenses offered by structuralists and their actual research projects.
Roland Barthes' S/Z and Mythologies are excellent cases in point.
One could of course argue that Marx also posited a limited number of
modes of production with each mode being based upon particular
inequalities in the unit of production. The emergence of these modes,
however, is not predicated simply upon logical derivations from a
limited number of possible modes any of which could exist at an ideal
level. Rather, the modes are determinant in the sense that they are
products of social forces, often social movements, which include
rational action consciously aimed at change, and as partial solutions
to "contradictions" existing in the previous mode.
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12. This danger is perhaps best detailed in the words of Paul Ricoeur
(1974:85), one of structuralism's more insightful critics:
An antinomy begins to show itself here: on the one hand,
structural linguistics starts from a decision of an episte-
mological character to remain inside the closure of the
universe of signs. By virtue of this decision, the system
has no outside; it is an autonomous entity of internal
dependencies. But this is a methodological decision which
does violence to linguistic experience. The task then, on
the other hand, to reclaim for the understanding of lang-
uage what the structural model excluded and what perhaps
is language itself as act of speech, as saying.... The claim
by some to demystify, as they put it, speech ought itself
be demystified, as being noncritical and naive.
13. Comte's social physics with its preoccupation with "natural/social
laws" is reproduced (albeit in modified form) throughout structuralist
research. For the structuralists Comte's "laws" are transformed into
laws/structures of discourse (Foucault and Barthes), universal cate-
gories of mind (Levi-Strauss), and rules of capitalist society (Althusser).
Thus the structuralists share with Comte a common faith in the ex-
istence and knowabiIity of structuring laws be they specific mani-
festations (e.g., in discourse) or in the nature of mind itself.
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therefore, given in the "gena-text" before they are masked and pre-
sented in a mystified articulation through the "pheno-text." As Culler
(1975:247) notes, however, the concept of a geno-text is no solution
at all. In many ways, the problem of the "gene-text" is homologous
to that which confronted Habermas (1971) in his analysis of "distorted
communication" the blockage to reasonable human decision making.
Habermas' solution, however, was not to open up all possibilities and
thereby engage his analysis in a set of infinitely varying avenues of
inquiry. Rather, he grounded his solution in the transformation of
history as detailed in the Marxian conception of ideology and labor.
Here Habermas sought to posit the idea of a "community of scientists'
that could, at least theoretically, transcend and/or accommodate the
delimiting influences of history.
7. Numerous anthologies and monographs on structuralism are avail-
able in English. In addition to those cited in the text and the biblio-
graphy, the following are among the better, and more recent ones:
Coward, Rosalind and J. Ellis, Language and Materialism, Boston:
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977; Gardner, Howard, The Quest for
Mind, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979; Hawkes, Terence,
Structuralism and Semiotics, Berkeley: University of California Press,
1977; Kurzweil, Edith, The Age ofStructuralism, New York: Columbia
University Press, 1980; and Seung, T.K. Structuralism and Hermeneu-
tics, New York: Columbia University Press, 1982.
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8. Dan Sperber's critique of Levi-Strauss in Structuralism en Anthro-
pologie (Paris: SeuiI, 1973) provides excellent insights into the the-
oretical weaknesses of Levi-Strauss' research program.
9 ~ Barthes and Foucault, both prominent structuralists, have acknowl-
edged an intellectual debt to Nietzsche. However, unlike T. Adorno and
other members of the "critical theory" tradition, the structuralists have
tended.to use Nietzsche's writing with little regard for its critical import
and/or potential. For the structuralists, Nietzsche symbolizes the spirit
of pessimism and despair so characteristic of structuralism itself. For
them Nietzsche justifies a return to scientific idiosyncratic thought and
action; a view which not only decenters man but also renders him
faithless and foolish. This advocacy of the idiosyncratic, despite its
frequently creative form, is of course only one possible reading of
Nietzsche. For a more detailed account of the structuralist attitude see
Gunter Schiwy's 1969 volume, Strukturalismum Und Christentum
(Freiberg: Herder KG).
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